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Abstract. In this paper, we consider the analysis and modelling of trust
in distributed information systems. We review the relations of trust re-
lationships in our previous work. We discuss trust layers and hierarchy
based on formal definition of trust relationship. We provide a set of
definitions to describe the properties of trust direction and trust sym-
metry under our taxonomy framework. In order to analyze and model
the scope and diversity of trust relationship, we define trust scope label
under our taxonomy framework. We provide some example scenarios to
illustrate the proposed definitions about properties of trust relationship.
The proposed definitions are new elements of the taxonomy framework
for enabling the analysis and modelling of trust. We provide some dis-
cussions about the life cycle of trust relationships. The proposed trust
structure and properties are currently being used in the development of
the overall methodology of life cycle of trust relationships in distributed
information systems.
1 Introduction
Trust has been studied in multiple dimensions in the computing world. As a
concept of security, trust was firstly introduced in trusted systems [1] and trusted
computing [2]. Marsh has tried to formalize trust as a computational concept
[3]. Several community-based reputation systems [4,5], trust negotiation systems
[6,7,8] and trust management systems [9,10,11]have been proposed.
Trust plays an important role in distributed information systems. The proper-
ties of trust and how to define/model trust relationships are important concerns
in the analysis and design of distributed information systems. Our main objec-
tive of this research is to develop a sound understanding of trust and to create a
powerful set of tools to analyze and model trust relationships in distributed in-
formation systems. In our earlier work [12], we have outlined a formal definition
of trust relationship. The target of the formal definition of trust relationships
is not only to reflect many of the commonly used notions of trust but also to
provide a taxonomy framework where a range of useful trust relationships can be
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expressed and compared. The research in [12] only provides a starting point for
the analysis and design of trust relationships. We provide a set of definitions for
the properties of trust direction and trust symmetry between involved entities
in distributed environments. We provide trust scope label and rules to compare
trust scope labels. The operations, definitions and rules are enabling tools in the
analysis and design of trust relationships in distributed information systems.
We provide examples of scenarios to show users how to understand and use the
proposed definitions about trust relationships in the real world. The research
provided in this paper is an important part of the overall methodology of life
cycle of trust relationships in distributed information systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide
the definition of trust relationship. In section 3, we describe a set of operations
and definitions for relations of trust relationships in distributed environments.
In section 4, we discuss the trust layers and hierarchy. In section 5, we pro-
vide a set of definitions for trust direction and trust symmetry. We employee
the Microsoft’s domain trust as a regressive scenario example to illustrate the
definitions in this section. In section 6, we discuss the scope and diversity of
trust relationships. In section 7, we provide some discussions about our overall
methodology of the life cycle of trust relationships in distributed environments.
Finally section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Definition of Trust Relationship
We have given a formal definition of trust relationship with a strict mathemati-
cal structure in our previous work [12]. This definition of trust relationship has
a broad expressive power and it is the cornerstone of our trust taxonomy frame-
work. All trust notions proposed in this paper is based on this definition. The
definition of trust relationship is expressed as:
Definition 1. A trust relationship is a four-tuple T =< R, E, C, P > where:
– R is the set of trusters. It contains all the involved trusters. It is a non empty
set.
– E is the set of trustees. It contains all the involved trustees. It is a non-empty
set.
– C is the set of conditions. It contains all conditions (requirements) for the
current trust relationship. Normally, a trust relationship has some specified
conditions. If there is no condition, the condition set is empty.
– P is the set of properties. The property set describes the actions or attributes
of the trustees. It is a non-empty set. The property set can be divided into
two sub sets:
• Action set: the set of actions that the trusters trust that trustees will and
can perform.
• Attribute set: the set of attributes that trusters trust that trustees have.
The formal definition of trust relationship can reflect the commonly used notions
of trust and provides a taxonomy framework. When trust relationships are used,
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the full syntax (four-tuple < R, E, C, P > must be followed. Trust relationship
T means that under the condition set C, truster set R trust that trustee set
E have the properties in set P . The definition of trust relationship provides a
starting point for capturing different forms of commonly understood notions of
trust. The above strict definition of the trust relationship is the basis for the
discussions of all properties of trust in this paper.
3 Relations of Trust Relationships
In the this section, we provide some operations and definitions about the rela-
tions of trust relationships. The relations of trust relationships play an important
role in the analysis and design of trust relationships in distributed information
systems. From the nature of trust relationship and its mathematical structure,
some new trust relationships can be derived based on the existing trust rela-
tionships. The operations of using two existing trust relationships to generate a
new trust relationship under specific constraints and operations of decomposing
one existing trust relationship into two new trust relationships under specific
constraints are defined as follows:
OPERATION 1. Let T1 = (R1, E1, C1, P1) and T2 = (R2, E2, C2, P2).
There is a set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 ∩ E2, C1 ∪ C2, P1 ∪ P2). If R1 ∩ R2 = ∅ or
E1 ∩ E2 = ∅, T = ∅.
If R1 = R2 and E1 = E2, the operation becomes:
OPERATION 1A. Let T1 = (R, E, C1, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C2, P2). There
is a set T = (R, E, C1 ∪ C2, P1 ∪ P2).
If R1 = R2, E1 = E2 and C1 = C2, the operation becomes:
OPERATION 1B. Let T1 = (R, E, C, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C, P2). Then
there is a set T = (R, E, C, P1 ∪ P2).
OPERATION 2. Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P ) and T2 = (R2, E2, C, P ). There
is a set T = (R1 ∪ R2, E1 ∩ E2, C, P ).
If E1 = E2, the operation becomes:
OPERATION 2A. Let T1 = (R1, E, C, P ) and T2 = (R2, E, C, P ). There
is a set T = (R1 ∪ R2, E, C, P ).
OPERATION 3. Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P ) and T2 = (R2, E2, C, P ). There
is a set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 ∪ E2, C, P ).
If R1 = R2, the operation becomes:
OPERATION 3A. Let T1 = (R, E1, C, P ) and T2 = (R, E2, C, P ). There
is a set T = (R, E1 ∪ E2, C, P ).
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OPERATION 4. Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are R1, R2 and R = R1∪
R2, then there are trust relationships T1 =< R1, E, C, P > and T2 = < R2,
E, C, P >.
OPERATION 5. Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are E1, E2 and E =
E1 ∪ E2, then there are trust relationships T1 =< R, E1, C, P > and T2 =
< R, E2, C, P >.
OPERATION 6. Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there are P1, P2 and P = P1∪
P2, then there are trust relationships T1 =< R, E, C, P1 > and T2 = < R,
E, C, P2 >.
This operation has the following special case:
OPERATION 6A. Let T =< R, E, C, P > and there are P1, P2, C1, C2
and P = P1 ∪P2, C = C1 ∪C2. If C1 is the condition set for P1 and C2 is the
condition set for P2, then there are trust relationships T1 =< R, E, C1, P1 >
and T2 =< R, E, C2, P2 >.
All operations can be used to generate new trust relationships from the existing
trust relationships under some specific constraints. The Operation 1 deals with
any two trust relationships and a new trust relationship is generated, if the result
is not ∅. The Operation 1A, 1B, 2A, 3A deal with how to use two trust rela-
tionships to generate new trust relationship under some specific constraints. The
Operation 4, 5, 6 and 6A deal with how to decompose one trust relationship
into two trust relationships under some specific constraints. Operation 1A and
Operation 6A are inverse operations. Operation 1B and Operation 6 are
inverse operations. Operation 2A and Operation 4 are inverse operations.
Operation 3A and Operation 5 are inverse operations.
In the discussion of trust relationships, we have defined the equivalent, prim-
itive, derived, direct redundant and alternate trust relationships and have clas-
sified the direct redundant trust relationships into different types. They are as
follows:
Definition 2. Let T1 =< R1, E1, C1, P1 > and T2 =< R2, E2, C2, P2 >.
If and only if R1 = R2 and E1 = E2 and C1 = C2 and P1 = P2, then T1 and
T2 are equivalent, in symbols:
T1 = T2 ⇐⇒ R1 = R2 and E1 = E2 and C1 = C2 and P1 = P2
Definition 3. If a trust relationship cannot be derived from other existing trust
relationships, the trust relationship is a primitive trust relationship.
Definition 4. If a trust relationship can be derived from other existing trust
relationships, the trust relationship is a derived trust relationship.
Note: Trust relationships are predefined in information systems. A derived trust
relationship is always related to one or more other trust relationships. For an
independent trust relationship, it is meaningless to judge it as a derived trust
relationship or not.
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Definition 5. Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If there is trust relationship T ′ =
< R′, E′, C′, P ′ > and T = T ′, R ⊆ R′, E ⊆ E′, C ⊇ C′, P ⊆ P ′.
T is a direct redundant trust relationship.
We now discuss several special cases of direct redundant trust relationships based
on the single tuple of trust relationship. We believe that these special cases play
important roles in the analysis and design of trust relationships.
TYPE 1 : DRLR (Direct Redundant of Less Trusters)
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is a trust relationship T ′ =
< R′, E, C, P > and R′ ⊃ R, T is a DRLR trust relationship.
T is DRLR trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with super set of trusters and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
TYPE 2 : DRLE (Direct Redundant of Less Trustees)
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is a trust relationship T ′ =
< R, E′, C, P > and E′ ⊃ E, T is a DRLE trust relationship.
T is DRLE trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with super set of trustees and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
TYPE 3 : DRMC (Direct Redundant of More Conditions)
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is an alternate trust relationship
T ′ =< R, E, C′, P > and C′ ⊂ C, T is a DRMC trust relationship.
T is DRMC trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with a subset of conditions and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
TYPE 4 : DRLP (Direct Redundant of Less Properties)
Let T =< R, E, C, P >. If and only if there is a trust relationship T ′ =
< R, E, C, P ′ > and P ′ ⊃ P , T is a DRLP trust relationship.
T is DRLP trust relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with super set of properties and all other tuples are same as peers in T .
Definition 6. Let T =< R, E, C, P >, T ′ =< R, E, C′, P > and C = C′.
T and T ′ are alternate trust relationships of each other.
An alternate trust relationship means that there is an alternate condition set for
the same truster set, trustee set and property set. Perhaps, there are multiple
alternate trust relationships. In distributed computing, multiple mechanisms and
multiple choices are necessary in many situations and it is the main reason why
we define and discuss alternate trust relationships here.
Scenario Example: Consider an online e-commerce service called FlightServ,
which can provide flight booking and travel deals. FlightServ is designed using
web services. FlightServ connects with customers, airlines, hotels and credit card
services (some of these may also be web services). The whole system could be very
complicated, but in this example, we only consider some basic trust relationships
in the system. In the system, customers are classified into normal flyers and
frequent flyers. Originally, some trust relationships are modelled as follows:
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TS2- 1. Airlines trust normal flyers can make their airline bookings, if they
have address details & confirmed credit card information.
TS2- 2. Airlines trust frequent flyers with no condition that frequent flyers can
make their airline bookings.
TS2- 3. Hotels trust normal flyers can make their hotels booking, if they have
address details & confirmed credit card information.
TS2- 4. Hotels trust frequent flyers can make their hotels booking, if they have
address details & confirmed credit card information.
TS2- 5. Credit card services are trusted by all possible entities without any con-
dition that the credit card services will give the correct evaluation of credit card
information.
TS2- 6. Credit card services are trusted by all possible entities without any con-
dition that the credit card services will keep the privacy of credit card information.
For the above trust relationships in the system, based on definitions and opera-
tions in section 3, we have the following analysis:
– All above trust relationships are primitive.
– Using the Operation 3A, trust relationships TS2-3 and TS2-4 can be
merged to a new trust relationship TS2-(3)(4): “Hotels trust customers if
they have address details & confirmed credit card information that customers
can make their hotels booking”. If TS2-(3)(4) has been defined in the
system, TS2-3 and TS2-4 becomes DRLE trust relationships and will be
removed out of the system.
– Using the Operation 1B, trust relationships TS2-5 and TS2-6 can be
merged to a new trust relationship TS2-(5)(6): “Credit card services are
trusted by all possible entities without any condition that the credit card
services will give the correct evaluation of credit card information & the
credit card services will keep the privacy of credit card information”. If TS2-
(5)(6) has been defined in the system, TS2-5 and TS2-6 becomes DRLP
trust relationships and will be removed out of the system.
We hope that the above scenario example can provide a general picture of mod-
elling trust relationships in distributed environments. We believe that these op-
erations and definitions are useful but they are not sufficient for the overall
methodology of modelling trust relationships in distributed environments. In
following sections, we will expand the taxonomy framework and discuss the clas-
sification of trust, trust layers, direction and symmetry of trust and the life cycle
of trust relationships in distributed environments.
4 Trust Layers and Hierarchy
Some researchers have tried to identify different forms of trust relationships [13].
Grandison et al [13] have given a bottom-up classification and used the terms as
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Fig. 1. Trust Layers
resources access trust, service provision trust, certification trust, delegation trust
and infrastructure trust. From the view point of establishment or evaluation of
trust relationships, all the above trust types must build on a more basic trust
relationship which is the authentication trust or identity trust.We will categorize
the trust relationships into two layers. Authentication is on layer one and other
types are on layer two. We will give a hierarchy of trust based on the nature of
the four tuples of trust relationship.
Authentication has continuously been an important topic in information secu-
rity community. There are many popular authentication schemes such as X.509
and PGP. Authentication trust belongs to a separate layer and all other trust
types belong to another layer above the authentication trust. This is illustrated
in Figure 1. Note that trust types of layer two may not be necessarily specified
in terms of an identity. Anonymous authorization belongs to access trust and
it is an example that there is no specified identity. Anonymous authorization
can be implemented using certificates with capabilities. The real identity of the
involved trustee will not be revealed. For example, a customer has a certificate
for accessing some resources on the Internet. The customer’s behaviors of access-
ing the resources can be recorded. If it is desirable that the customer cannot be
identified, the related access trust is a kind of anonymous access trust. Partic-
ularly for the resource access trust and service provision trust, the anonymous
authentication is desirable in some cases. In such a situation, the layer of authen-
tication still needs to provide a mechanism to deal with the same entity as the
trustee in the whole scope of the trust process. Normally, there is a temporary
and dynamic identification which will be uniquely connected with the involved
trustee in the scope of the trust process.
Authentication trust is the only type of trust at layer one. At layer two, trust
relationships can be classified in different ways. In the following, we will give an-
other kind of classification which is different from the bottom-up classification
of Grandison et al. Based on strict definition of trust relationship, trust relation-
ships at layer two can be classified according to the nature of the trustees in trust
relationship < R, E, C, P >. If E is an infrastructure, the trust relationship
belongs to infrastructure trust. If E is not an infrastructure, the trust relation-
ship belongs to non-infrastructure trust. Non-infrastructure trust relationships
can be classified based on the ownership of the property set. If the trusters have
the ownership of the property set, the trust relationship belongs to access trust.
If the trustees have the ownership of the property set, the trust relationship be-
longs to provision trust. If some properties are owned by trustees and some other
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Fig. 2. Trust Hierarchy
properties are owned by trusters, then the trust relationship belongs to mixture
(A&P) trust. The hierarchy of trust relationships at layer two is illustrated in
Figure 2. In such a classification, delegation trust and certification trust are not
independent types. As we have discussed, the delegation trust is a special form
of provision trust, trustees are the providers of delegated decisions on behalves
of trusters. A certification trust can be any subtype of non-infrastructure trust
based on the nature of its property set.
5 Direction and Symmetry of Trust
In this section, we will provide a set of definitions for the properties of trust direc-
tion and trust symmetry. The properties of trust direction and trust symmetry
play an important role in the analysis and modelling of trust in distributed infor-
mation systems. These definitions provide general descriptions about the prop-
erties of trust direction and trust symmetry. A scenario example is provided to
illustrate these definitions and their usage. We hope that these definitions can
cover most situations in the real world and can be used as standard scenarios
for analyzing and modelling trust about properties of direction and symmetry.
In real systems, one or multiple kinds of trust direction and trust symmetry can
be chosen based on the specified requirements of the information systems.
The properties of trust direction and symmetry are related to each other
and they should be cooperatively used to analyze and model the properties of
direction and symmetry of trust in distributed environments. For the properties
of trust direction, one-way trust relationship, two-way trust relationship and
reflexive trust relationship are defined. For the properties of trust symmetry,
symmetric trust relationships, symmetric two-way trust relationship, and the
whole set of trust relationships are defined. The details of the definitions are
described as follows.
Definition 7. One-way trust relationship is the trust relationship with a unique
trust direction from the trusters to trustees.
One-way is the default feature of a trust relationship if there is no further de-
scription.
Two-way trust relationship can be defined and used in information systems
such as Microsoft’s domain trust. Actually, two-way trust relationship is the
result of binding two one-way trust relationships together. We define two-way
trust relationship as follows:
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Definition 8. Two-way trust relationship TT ′ is the binding of two one-way
trust relationships T =< R, E, C, P > and T ′ =< R′, E′, C′, P ′ > with
R′ = E and E′ = R. T and T ′ are the reflective trust relationships with each
other in the two-way trust relationship.
In the above definition, “binding” is the key word. If there are two one-way
trust relationships between R and E but they are not bound with each other,
then they are only two one-way trust relationships and there is no two-way trust
relationship. When two one-way trust relationships are bound together, there is
a two-way trust relationship and these two one-way trust relationships can be
called reflective trust relationships with each other.
If the trusters and the trustees are the same, the trust relationship is reflexive.
The reflexive trust relationship is defined as follows:
Definition 9. Trust relationships T =< R, E, C, P > is an reflexive trust
relationship when R = E.
The symmetry of two trust relationships could be an important concern in the
analysis or modelling of trust relationships in distributed information systems.
The symmetry of two trust relationships is defined as the follows:
Definition 10. If there is trust relationship T ′ =< R′, E′, C′, P ′ > which is
the result of swapping trusters and trustees in another trust relationship T =<
R, E, C, P > (the swapping includes all possible ownerships in condition set
and property set), there is symmetry between T and T ′, T and T ′ are symmetric
trust relationships with each other.
In the above definition, the swapping of trusters and trustees includes all pos-
sible ownerships in condition set and property set. The two trust relationships
have the same condition set and property set except the possible ownerships
in them. The symmetric/asymmetric two-way trust relationship is defined as
follows:
Definition 11. A two-way trust relationship TT ′ is symmetric two-way trust
relationship if there is symmetry between T and T ′; otherwise TT ′ is an asym-
metric two-way trust relationship.
Sometimes it is necessary to discuss the symmetry of all trust relationships be-
tween a truster set and a trustee set, we have the following definition:
Definition 12. WTR(R,E) is the whole set of trust relationships with same
truster set R and trustee set E.
Definition 13. If every trust relationship in WTR(R,E) has a symmetric trust
relationship in WTR(E,R) and every trust relationship in WTR(E,R) has a
symmetric trust relationship in WTR(R,E), the trust between R and E are
symmetric.
Scenario Example: Here we use Microsoft’s domain trust as a regressive sce-
nario example to discuss the properties of trust direction and trust symmetry
Analysis and Modelling of Trust in Distributed Information Systems 115
defined in this section. Domain trust allows users to authenticate to resources
in another domain. Also, an administrator is able to administer user rights for
users in the other domain. Our general definitions for the properties of direc-
tion and symmetry of trust relationships have general expressive power and can
cover broad range of commonly used notations. The related concepts in domain
trust can be viewed as specific cases of these general definitions. In the follow-
ing, we will use our terms defined in this paper to review some concepts in
domain trust.
– Based on definition 1 in section 2, the domain trust can be expressed as
“entities in domain A trust entities in domain B without any condition that
entities in domain B have the right to get access of the set of resources in
domain A”.
– Microsoft’s domain trust includes both one-way trust and two-way trust.
In Microsoft’s domain trust, one-way trust is defined as a unidirectional
authentication path created between two domains. This means that in a
one-way trust between domain A and domain B, users in domain A can
access resources in domain B. However, users in domain B cannot access
resources in domain A. Microsoft’s one-way trust is an example of one-way
trust relationship in definition 7. In a two-way domain trust, authentication
requests can be passed between the two domains in both directions. Two-way
trust is an example of two-way trust relationship in definition 8.
– The entities in same domain trust each other without any condition that
entities have the right to get access of the set of resources in the same
domain. This is an example of reflexive trust relationship in definition 9.
– There is symmetry in the two-way domain trust. The two one-way trust
relationships bound in the two-way trust relationship are “entities in domain
A trust entities in domain B without any condition that entities in domain B
have the right to get access of the set of resources in domain A” and “entities
in domain B trust entities in domain A without any condition that entities
in domain A have the right to get access of the set of resources in domain
B”. These two one-way trust relationships are symmetric trust relationships
with each other in definition 10. Microsoft’s two-way trust is symmetric
two-way trust relationship in definition 11.
– In domain trust, the WTR(A, B) based on definition 12 has only one
trust relationship from truster domain A to trustee domain B. For two-way
domain trust, the trust between domain A and domain B is symmetric based
on definition 13.
The above definitions about the properties of trust direction and trust symmetry
are new elements of the taxonomy framework about trust. We believe that they
can cover most situations related with direction and symmetry of trust relation-
ship in the real world. These definitions can provide suitable terms and can be
used as scenario examples in the analysis and modelling of trust in distributed
information systems.
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6 Scope and Diversity of Trust Relationship
In this section, we will discuss the scope and diversity of trust relationship in
distributed information systems. The diversity of trust has been discussed by
Jøsang [14] who expresses trust in three diversity dimensions. The first dimension
represents trusters or trust originators, the second represents the trust purpose,
and the third represents trustees. Jøsang uses the term trust purpose based
on the observation that trust is relative to a domain of actions. In our formal
definition of trust relationship, trusters and trustees are two tuples and they are
similar to the terms of Jøsang. The origin diversity about trusters and target
diversity about trustees are straightforward and have been described clearly by
Jøsang [14]. Jøsang’s term of trust purpose is related to a domain of actions.
Under our taxonomy framework, we will define trust scope label to take the
place of the trust purpose. There are multiple benefits of trust scope label other
than the trust purpose and they will be discussed later in this section. The trust
scope label is the binding of the condition set and property set based on the
formal definition of trust relationship. The trust scope label is a new element
of our taxonomy framework. The definition of trust scope label is expressed as
follows:
Definition 14. A trust scope label is a two-tuple TSL =< C, P > where C is
a set of conditions and P is a set of properties.
The details of condition set C and property set P can be found in the formal
definition of trust relationship in section 2. Actually, trust scope label provides a
new layer of abstraction under the trust relationship and it defines the properties
of the trust and its associated conditions. To compare two trust scope labels
TSL1 =< C1, P1 > and TSL2 =< C2, P2 >, we have the following rules:
1. C1 ⊆ C2 and P1 ⊇ P2 ⇐⇒ TSL1 ≥ TSL2;
2. C1 = C2 and P1 = P2 ⇐⇒ TSL1 = TSL2;
3. C1 ⊇ C2 and P1 ⊆ P2 ⇐⇒ TSL1 ≤ TSL2.
4. In other cases, TSL1 and TSL2 can not be compared with each other.
The trust scope label is beyond the trust purpose in several aspects. Trust scope
label composes of a subspace of trust relationships (two tuples out of four tu-
ples) and describes the characteristics of the combination of condition set C and
property set P . Trust scope labels could be treated as an independent subspace
of trust relationships in the analysis and design of overall information systems.
The property set in trust scope label covers not only actions but also attributes
of trustees. Two trust scope labels could be compared with each other based on
the rules given above.
Scenario Example: Consider an online software shop. We assume that any-
body who wants to enter the online shop must register as a member of the
online shop first. For describing the condition set and property set in possible
trust relationships between the shop and possible customers, we use the following
notations:
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– p1 stands for that customers can read the documentation of the software.
– p2 stands for that customers can download the software.
– c1 stands for certificate of membership.
– c2 stands for the commitment of the payment for the software.
– c3 stands for the payment for the software.
We have the following trust scope labels:
1. TSL1 =< {c1}, {p1} >
2. TSL2 =< {c1, c2}, {p1, p2} >
3. TSL3 =< {c1, c2, c3}, {p1, p2} >
Based on the rules to compare two trust scope labels, we have
– TSL1 cannot be compared with TSL2 (or TSL3). There is no obvious rela-
tionship between TSL1 and TSL2 (or TSL3).
– TSL2 > TSL3. It means that the trust scope of TSL2 is less strict than
that of TSL3.
The scope and diversity of trust is another aspect to be considered in the analysis
and modelling of trust in distributed information systems. The trust scope label
may be quite complicated and the above comparison rules provide helpful tools
in making judgements. The scope and diversity of trust may be coupled with
other trust properties such as trust direction and trust symmetry.
7 Life Cycle of Trust Relationships
We are currently working on a methodology for life cycle of trust relationships
using the definition of trust relationship, operations of trust relationships and the
properties of trust relationship. Trust relationships between possible entities play
crucial roles in the collaborative interactions in distributed environments. The
analysis and design of trust relationship must be integrated with other require-
ments of the whole distributed information system. The modelling, implementing
and maintaining of trust relationships is an incremental, iterative process. The
whole life cycle of trust relationships includes several stages such as extracting
trust requirements in system, identifying possible trust relationships from trust
requirements, choosing and refining the whole set of trust relationships from
possible trust relationships, implementing trust relationships in systems and
maintaining trust relationships in systems. The initial trust relationships will
be refined in multiple life cycles. There are two ways to accommodate new busi-
ness requirements. One way is to introduce new trust relationships and another
way is to modify existing trust relationships. When new trust relationships are
introduced, several things need to be considered such as the scope and diversity
of these trust relationships, the properties of direction and symmetry of these
trust relationships and the relations between them and existing trust relation-
ships. In section 3, 4,5 and 6, we have proposed a set of operations and definitions
to enable the analysis of the above. We have also given some example scenarios.
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We believe that they are helpful in the analysis and design of trust relationships
for collaborative interactions in the distributed environments and they are part
of our overall methodology of life cycle of trust relationships. When trust rela-
tionships are modified, the change management of trust relationships must be
considered. We are in the process of developing change management schemes for
trust relationships, which will become part of our overall methodology as well.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have focused on the analysis and modelling of trust in dis-
tributed information systems. We have reviewed the definition of trust relation-
ship and operations and definitions about relations of trust relationships. We
have discussed the classification of trust under our taxonomy framework. We
have discussed different forms of trust and put authentication at layer one of
trust and other trust types on layer two. Authentication plays a foundation role
for other trust types on layer two. We have proposed a hierarchy of layer two
trust relationships based on the nature of four tuples of a trust relationship. This
hierarchy is helpful to understand the purposes of trust relationships in the real
world. We provide multiple definitions about the properties of trust direction
and trust symmetry. We have defined trust scope label to model the properties
of scope and diversity of trust. All the definitions proposed in this paper are new
elements of our taxonomy framework and they can be used as enabling tools in
the analysis and modelling of trust in distributed information systems.
In real implementations, properties of trust discussed in this paper will be
customized and configured based on the specific requirements. We are currently
working on an overall methodology of life cycle of trust relationships in dis-
tributed information systems. This research focuses on the properties of trust
relationships and taxonomy framework. The definition of trust relationship pro-
vides a starting point and it is the cornerstone of this research. The relations
of relationships can provide useful tools for enabling the analysis, design and
implementation of trust in distributed information systems. The classification of
trust are helpful for better understanding of trust and is helpful in the analysis
of trust. The definitions about trust direction, trust symmetry and trust scope
can provide suitable terms for the related properties and they can be used as
tools for enabling the analysis and modelling of trust in distributed information
systems. In the web services paradigm, we hope that the proposed properties of
trust and tools for analysis and modelling trust can provide solid foundation for
trust related issues in WS-Trust, WS-Security, WS-Policy and WS-Federation.
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